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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gamino conditionally admitted to violating his probation but asserts that 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation. He appeals from the 
district court's denial of his motion to dismiss his probation violation. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Gamino and his friends burglarized the Carey School in Carey, Idaho to 
obtain money to purchase drugs. (R., pp. 9-16; PSI, p. 2.) They stole 
approximately $2500 in cash, a laptop computer, a digital camera, and several 
other items. (R., p. 10.) The damage to the school was significant. (R. p. 10.) 
Gamino was charged with 2 counts of burglary and 1 count of grand theft. 
(R., pp. 31-33.) Gamino pled guilty to burglary pursuant to a plea agreement with 
the state. (R., pp. 34-36.) The state agreed to recommend a 5 year sentence, 
with 3 years fixed, suspend the sentence and to place Gamino on probation with 
30 days county jail time. (R., p. 35; 5/10/04 Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 5, L. 2.) On May 
10, 2004, the district court sentenced Gamino to 7 years with 5 years fixed, 
suspended the sentence, and placed Gamino on 4 years of supervised 
probation. (R., pp. 46-50.) The district court also ordered Gamino to pay 
$7,221.25 in restitution to Carey School. (R., p. 53.) The restitution order stated 
that Gamino pay the restitution on a "schedule to be determined by the 
defendant's probation officer and prior to the defendant's release from probation." 
(R., p. 63.) 
The state filed a petition to revoke Gamino's probation on July 21, 2005. 
(R., pp. 85-86.) On October 24, 2005, Gamino admitted that he violated his 
probation. (R., p. 134.) The district court did not revoke Gamino's probation but 
rather continued Gamino's probation under the same terms and conditions as 
previously imposed. (R., p. 140.) 
The state signed its second petition to revoke Gamino's probation on May 
9,2008 (R., p. 157), and the document was delivered to the judge's chambers for 
the judge's signature that same day (811 1/08 Tr., p. 19, L. 4 - p. 20, L. 12). The 
district court judge signed the petition to revoke probation on May 14, 2008, and 
it was filed on May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 156-58.) The second probation violation 
alleged that Gamino had failed to pay his restitution and costs of supervision as 
previously ordered. (R., pp. 182-83.) 
Gamino filed a motion to dismiss the probation violation for lack of 
timeliness, asserting that his probation expired on May 10, 2008, and that the 
petition was not filed until May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 190-91.) The district court 
denied Gamino's motion to dismiss probation violation (R., p. 193), and on 
September 15, 2008, Gamino entered a conditional admission to his probation 
violation, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss (R., p. 
195). The district court extended Gamino's probation for a period of 2 years with 
the caveat that Gamino could be released from probation early upon payment of 
all previously ordered restitution and costs of supervision. (R., pp. 199-200.) 
Gamino timely appealed. (R., pp. 201-04.) 
ISSUES 
Gamino states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gamino's motion to 
dismiss where probation had expired by the time the State filed its 
petition to revoke probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Gamino failed to show that the district court erred by denying 
his motion to dismiss the petition to revoke probation? 
ARGUMENT 
Gamino Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion To Dismiss The Petition To Revoke Probation 
A. Introduction 
The district court sentenced Gamino to 4 years supervised probation on 
May 10, 2004. The companion restitution order, entered at the same time, 
ordered Gamino to pay restitution on a "schedule to be determined by the 
defendant's probation officer and prior to the defendant's release from probation." 
(R., p. 63.) Gamino asserts that because his probation ended on May 10,2008, 
and the petition to revoke his probation was not file-stamped until May 16, 2008, 
that the district court did not have jurisdiction to extend his probation. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) He claims that the district court erred in applying ldaho 
Code 3 19-2602 in revoking his probation rather than ldaho Code § 20-222. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) Gamino has failed to show error. The district court 
had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's probation under either statute, and properly 
applied ldaho Code § 19-2602 in revoking Gamino's probation. 
B. Standard of Review 
Questions of statutory interpretation are given free review. State v. Beard, 
135 ldaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116,121 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. ldaho Code 5 ?9-2602 Permits Filinq A Probation Violation Affer The 
Probation Term Has Expired 
The standards applicable to the construction of statutes are well 
established: 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. When the 
court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to 
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To 
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words 
of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the 
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is 
incumbent upon the court to give a statute an interpretation that will 
not render it a nullity. Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of 
a crime, this Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor 
of the defendant. 
e, 135 ldaho at 646, 22 P.3d at 121 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). Thus, a court facing a question of interpretation of a statute must first 
determine if the statute is plain and unambiguous. If not, the court must then 
resort to legislative history and rules of statutory interpretation to determine 
legislative intent. Finally, only if the statute still remains ambiguous after applying 
all rules of statutory construction will the court apply the rule of lenity and resolve 
the remaining ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Beard, 135 ldaho at 646, 22 
ldaho Code § 19-2602 reads: 
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and 
conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by 
the court or any of them have been violated or for any other cause 
satisfactory to the court, the court may, at any time within the 
longest period for which the defendant might have been 
originally sentenced by judgment of the court, issue a bench 
warrant for the rearrest of the defendant. 
I.C. 5 19-2602 (emphasis added). By its plain language, a probation violation 
proceeding may be commenced against a defendant "at any time within the 
longest period for which the defendant might have originally been sentenced." 
The maximum sentence upon conviction of the crime of burglary is 10 years. I.C. 
§ 18-1403. Because the probation violation in this case was filed within 10 years 
of Gamino's sentencing, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's 
probation, 
In holding that ldaho Code § 19-2602 applied to Gamino's situation, the 
district court reasoned: 
[M]y determination is going to be that the allegation is that the 
probation was not compiled with during - the allegation arose 
during the four-year term in which the defendant was on probation 
and that the motion for by the prosecutor is timely under 19-2602. 
It was at least signed before the probation terminated. It was not 
filed before the probation period set by the Court was terminated, 
but it filed during the 10-year period under 19-2602. 
(811 1/08 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 15-23.) 
Gamino's argument that ldaho Code § 19-2602 should not apply to his 
situation is contrary not only to the plain language of the statute but also to rules 
of statutory construction. Gamino asks this court to effectively delete the phrase, 
"at any time within the longest period for which the defendant might have been 
originally sentenced by judgment of the court." This is contrary to the well-settled 
rules of statutory construction that prohibit interpreting a statute in such a way as 
to render part of its language superfluous or to nullifL portions of it. State v. 
Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1996) (it is incumbent 
upon the court to interpret the statute in such a manner that will not nullify it, and 
it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a 
superfluous statute); State v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663, 665, 991 P.2d 388, 390 
(Ct. App. 1999) (statutory construction requires statute to be read so as to 
ascertain and give effect to legislative purpose and to give force and effect to 
every part of the statute); Belt v. Belt, 106 ldaho 426, 431, 679 P.2d 1144, 1149 
(1984) (construction of a statute should be adopted which does not deprive 
provisions of the statute of their meaning). Despite these rules that prohibit 
interpreting a statute in such a way as to deprive a provision of its meaning, 
Gamino asks this court to give the statute just such an interpretation. Gamino's 
interpretation of the statute is erroneous. 
Several jurisdictions with statutes similar to I.C. § 19-2602 permit filing a 
probation violation after expiration of the term of probation. Former United States 
code governing probation violations allowed the filing of probation violations after 
termination of probation. 18 U.S.C.A. 3653 (repealed in 1987) permitted a court 
to issue a warrant for a probation violation "at any time within the probation 
period, or within the maximum probation period permitted by section 3651 of this 
title ...." (emphasis added). Under the provisions of former 18 U.S.C.A. 3651, 
"the period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed 
five years." 
Courts have interpreted this section to mean that a court could issue a 
warrant and revoke an individual's probation at any time during the maximum five 
year probationary period so long as the acts causing the probation violation 
occured within a probationer's period of probation. United States v. O'Quinn, 689 
F.2d 1359, 1360 ( l l t h  Cir. 1982); United States v. Gammarano, 732 F.2d 273, 
277 (2"d Cir. 1984); United States v. Blunt, 680 F.2d 1216, 1218-1 9 (8th Cir. 
1982). Clearly, the period of probation and the period within which the court 
retained jurisdiction to revoke probation were understood to be different. United 
States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992,998 (9" Cir. 1993). 
Likewise, several other states also permit commencement of probation 
revocation proceedings after the probation term has expired. The ability to 
commence probation revocation proceedings after the expiration of the probation 
term depends in large part on the specific wording of the state's probation 
statute. For example, Alaska's probation statutes are similar to the former 
federal code and permit a trial court to revoke probation within the five-year 
maximum period despite the fact that formal probation may terminate prior to the 
filing of the petition to revoke probation. Galaktionoft v. Alaska, 733 P.2d 628 
(Alaska App. 1987). 
In construing its probation statutes, North Dakota also allows 
commencement of probation revocation proceedings on a violation during the 
period of probation after a term of probation has expired. State v. Decker, 209 
N.W.2d 879 (ND. 1973). The Decker court adopted the following rationale for its 
interpretation of its statutes: 
It seems clear that, for the proper operation of a probation system 
and the attainment of the rehabilitation of the defendant at which it 
aims, the court must have the power, even after the expiration of 
the probationary period, to punish a violation which occurs during 
the period, provided the court acts within a reasonable time after 
the violation. It seems obvious that a violation which takes place on 
the last day of the probationary period, or so near the end of the 
probationary period that the court cannot act within the period, 
should be punishable by revocation of the probation thereafter. 
Similarly, a serious violation of the terms of probation which occurs 
under circumstances which prevent it from coming to the attention 
of the probation authorities or the court until after the expiration of 
the probationary period, should be punishable promptly after the 
court learns of it. 
In each such case, the question reduces to whether the delay in the 
revocation and the imposition of the prison sentence is reasonable. 
It is sufficient that the court which imposed the probation should act 
promptly after the violation is discovered or, in the case of an 
accusation of a crime, after the conviction, even though the 
probationary period has expired meanwhile. 
Decker, 209 N.W.2d at 884, citing Commonwealth v. Duff, 192 A.2d 258, 262-63 
(Pa.Super. 1963). Since Decker, the North Dakota legislature has repealed its 
former probation scheme and replaced it with a statute that permits a probation 
violation to be filed within 60 days of the termination of probation. N.D.C.C. 
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in interpreting its statutory 
scheme, held that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over the probationer 
within a reasonable time after expiration of the term, so that probation violations 
occurring on the last day of the probation could result in probation revocation 
after the probationary term. Phoenix v. Nebraska, 162 Neb. 669,77 N.W.2d 237 
(1956). The proceeding must commence within the probationary period or within 
a reasonable time thereafter. White v. Nebraska, 193 Neb. 93, 94, 225 N.W.2d 
Consistent with these cases, Idaho Code § 19-2602 permits filing a 
probation violation after a probation term has expired. The period of probation 
and the period within which the court can revoke probation are clearly different. 
Any other reading renders the phrase, "at any time within the longest period for 
which the defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the 
court" a nullity and is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. For this 
reason, the district court did not err in revoking Gamino's probation after the term 
of his probation had expired 
D. ldaho Code 5 20-222 Also Permits Filinq A Probation Violation When An 
Individual Is Not On Probation 
ldaho Code § 20-222 reads, in relevant part: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court 
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation 
or suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be 
arrested. Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke 
the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence 
imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought 
before it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose 
any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time 
of conviction. 
ldaho Code 9 20-222 (emphasis added). 
By its plain language, a probation violation proceeding may be 
commenced against a defendant "at any time during probation or suspension of 
sentence." Gamino received a 7 year suspended sentence. Because the 
probation violation in this case was filed prior to the expiration of the suspended 
sentence term, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Gamino's probation. 
Gamino asks this court to ignore the phrase "or suspension of sentence" 
in I.C. § 20-222. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) However, Gamino's interpretation is 
contrary to the well-settled rules of statutory construction that prohibit interpreting 
a statute in such a way as to render part of its language superfluous, and require 
giving meaning to every word and phrase employed by the legislature. State v. 
Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1996). Despite these 
rules that prohibit interpreting a statute in such a way as to deprive a provision of 
its meaning, Gamino asks this court to give the statute just such an interpretation. 
The court of appeals had read I.C. § 20-222 and I.C. § 19-2602 broadly 
and has held that a judge may act upon a "violation of a clearly implied condition" 
of a suspended sentence. Hancock v. State, 111 ldaho 835, 838, 727 P.2d 
1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 1996). In Hancock, the sentencing court suspended all but 
the first 11 months of Hancock's 10 year sentence. Hancock, 11 1 ldaho at 836, 
727 P.2d at 1264. The sentencing court failed to mention probation either orally 
or in its written order. Hancock, 111 ldaho at 836, 37, 727 P.2d at 1263, 64. 
Several months later, while Hancock was serving his sentence in the county jail, 
a criminal complaint was filed against him charging him with a possession of a 
dangerous weapon by an inmate. Hancock, I I I ldaho at 837, 727 P.2d at 1265. 
While this new charge was pending, the sentencing court held a hearing to 
correct the language in the original order and included probationary language in 
the amended order. Id. Hancock did not object to this. Id. Hancock admitted to 
violating his probation in exchange of the state's dismissal of the new charge and 
waived his right to written notice of the alleged probation violation. Id. Upon 
Hancock's admission of the probation violation, the sentencing court reinstated 
Hancock's full original sentence as amended. Id. 
Later, on appeal, Hancock argued that he was not on probation, had never 
been informed of the conditions of that probation, and could not be subject to 
revocation of his suspended sentence. Id. The state argued that even if 
Hancock was not on probation or was not informed of the conditions of his 
probation, that he nevertheless was subject to revocation of his suspended 
sentence based on the language of I.C. § 20-222. Hancock, 11 1 Idaho at 838, 
727 P.2d at 1266. The court of appeals agreed and held: 
We note that I.C. § 19-2602 likewise provides that where a 
sentence has been suspended the court may issue a bench 
warrant for a violation of the terms and conditions of probation "or 
for any other cause satisfactory to the court ...." "When the 
defendant is brought before the court in such case ... if judgment 
was originally pronounced but suspended, the original judgment 
shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according to 
law . . . ." I.C. § 19-2603. 
We deem it clear that Hancock's admitted commission of a felony - 
possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate - was a "cause 
satisfactory to the court" for revoking the suspended sentence. Of 
course, we do not suggest that a judge arbitrarily may revoke a 
suspended sentence for any reason that pleases him. But we do 
hold that the judge may act upon violation of a clearly implied 
condition such as refraining from the commission of a felony. 
Id (emphasis added). -
As a term of Gamino's probation, he was ordered to pay restitution and 
court costs. After his probation expired but prior to the expiration of his 
suspended sentence, the judge revoked and reinstated Gamino's probation. 
Even if the terms of Gamino's probation did not apply after the expiration of his 
period of probation, the judge acted "upon [a] violation of a clearly implied 
condition" of Gamino's suspended sentence, i.e. that he would pay his restitution, 
and correctly revoked and reinstated Gamino to probation for an additional 2 
years. 
The plain language and interpretative case law of I.C. § 20-222 clearly 
permit a probation violation to be filed against a defendant when that individual is 
not on probation. Any other reading renders the language "or suspension of 
sentence" a nullity and is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. The 
district court had jurisdiction under I.C. § 20-222 to revoke Gamino's probation. 
E. ldaho Code 5 19-2602 and ldaho Code 6 20-222 Are Consistent And May 
Be Read Harmoniously 
Statutes that relate to the same subject matter are in pari materia and 
should be construed together to effectuate legislative intent. Grand Canyon 
Dories v. ldaho State Tax Comm'n., 124 ldaho 1, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 (1993). 
In determining legislative intent, this court should examine the reasonableness of 
the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statutes so that all of the 
applicable sections can be construed together. J.R. Simplot Co. v. ldaho State 
Tax Comm'n., 120 ldaho 849, 854, 820 P.2d 1206, 1212 (1991). When statutes 
cannot be read consistently, however, different rules apply. Where two statutes 
appear to apply to the same case, the specific should control over the general. 
K. Hefner, Inc. v. Caremark, 128 ldaho 726, 732, 918 P.2d 595, 601 (1996) 
(citing, Citv of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Hiqhwav District., 126 ldaho 145, 
149, 879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). See also, State v. Tavlor, 58 ldaho 656, 667, 
78 P.2d 125, 130 (1938) ("Where two acts deal with a common subject-matter, 
the one which deals with it in the more minute and particular way will prevail."). 
ldaho Code § 19-2602 and ldaho Code § 20-222 are consistent. ldaho 
Code § 20-222 allows the court to issue a warrant for a probation violation during 
the term of probation or suspension of sentence. ldaho Code § 19-2602 
provides that a court may issue a warrant on a probation violation "at any time 
within the longest period for which the defendant might have been originally 
sentenced." There is no inconsistency because "during probation or suspension 
of sentence," I.C. § 20-222, and "the longest period for which the defendant 
might have originally been sentenced," I.C. 5 19-2602, are entirely compatible, at 
least for purposes of this case. Both statutes permit the filing of a probation 
revocation when an individual is not on probation. Both statutes contemplate that 
a probation violation may not be known until after the probation term has expired 
or that a probation violation may occur so close to the end of the term of 
probation that it is impractical for the state to discover and prosecute the violation 
prior to the expiration of the probation term. To construe these statutes 
otherwise requires this court to ignore the plain language of the statutes. This 
reading also permits the statutes to be read in harmony with each other. 
Gamino's asserts that to the extent that I.C. § 20-222 and I.C. § 19-2602 
conflict, I.C. 3 20-222 controls. However, as discussed above, the district court 
had jurisdiction to revoke his probation under either statute. To hold otherwise 
ignores the plain language of both statutes and nullifies the phrases "suspension 
of a sentence" in I.C. § 20-222 and "at any time within the longest period for 
which the defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the 
court" in I.C. Ij 19-2602. 
Gamino has failed to show that the district court erred when it failed to 
dismiss his motion to dismiss his probation violation. After reviewing ldaho Code 
§ 19-2602 and ldaho Code § 20-222, the district court correctly concluded it 
could extend Gamino's probation an additional two years. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Harrison Gamino's 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 19" day of October, 2009. 
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